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 The People’s Republic of China makes extensive territorial claims over Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea� China’s neighbors openly dis-
pute these claims and the international community does not recognize most of 
them� The Chinese government views the settlement of these disputes on terms 
favorable to China as a national priority� Ideally, the Chinese government would 
like to resolve these disputes through diplomatic channels or by using coercive 
and paramilitary techniques that fall short of triggering armed conflicts�1 How-
ever, concurrently the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing war plans 
and acquiring capabilities to resolve these disputes through the use of armed 
force� The Chinese government views all its territorial disputes as “core interests” 
and has signaled its willingness to achieve these core interests through the use of 
armed force� The U�S� government openly opposes any coercive or aggressive ac-
tivities that upset the status quo, putting it at odds with the Chinese government�2
The problem is that the Chinese leadership appears unconvinced that the 
United States would risk a conflict with China—one that could escalate to a 
nuclear war—over disputes concerning territo-
ries that geographically are distant from the U�S� 
mainland and seemingly are unrelated to core U�S� 
national security interests�3 However, the PLA has a 
relatively small nuclear arsenal, estimated at fewer 
than four hundred warheads, in contrast with the 
U�S� arsenal, which has around 1,550 warheads�4 
Any nuclear strike China made on the United 
States would involve only a fraction of the PLA’s 
overall arsenal, because it would need to retain 
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some reserve to deter other nuclear-armed neighbors, such as Russia and India� 
If the Chinese leadership authorized a nuclear strike against the U�S� homeland, 
or even a limited nuclear strike against forward-deployed U�S� forces, it would 
be inviting overwhelming devastation from the considerably larger U�S� nuclear 
force�5 For these reasons, China likely would aim to confine itself to the use 
of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the 
United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of 
long-range, conventional, theater-strike options�6 Such a strategic, conventional, 
first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by 
developing an effective conventional access strategy�
The U�S� military has three principal strategic objectives� The first is to protect 
the U�S� mainland and offshore U�S� territories from armed attacks�7 The second 
is to foster a stable, rules-based, global security order through an interconnected 
web of alliances and partnerships� The third is to deter and, if necessary, decisive-
ly defeat aggressors through the projection of military power� Under the national 
military strategy that the Joint Staff published in 2015, the U�S� military would 
deter and defeat state aggressors by leveraging U�S� forward-deployed units, 
force-projection capabilities, alliances, communications networks, and “resilient 
logistics” infrastructure�8 This strategy appears identical to the U�S� military’s 
force-projection approach to the 1991 Gulf War�9 But the central problem with 
emulating the Gulf War style of force-projection operations is that in future de-
cades the U�S� military no longer will enjoy uncontested use of its forward bases 
or the ocean�10
Operation DESERT STORM required the U�S� military to transport around five 
hundred thousand personnel, 6�1 million tons of fuel, and 3�7 million tons of 
equipment and stores to the Persian Gulf theater� Building up sufficient person-
nel, equipment, stores, and supplies required seven months of intense air and 
sealift operations, as well as access to bases in Saudi Arabia�11 Because of the range 
limitations of tactical aircraft and payload-laden airlifters, the U�S� Air Force 
(USAF) was forced to use in-flight refueling tankers to form “air bridges�” Air 
bridges allowed aircraft with range limitations to cross oceans by flying between 
in-flight refueling tankers until they reached the desired theater of operations� 
USAF in-flight refueling tankers also supported U�S� and allied short-range tacti-
cal aircraft, flying around 16,868 sorties to deliver four hundred thousand tons 
of fuel in flight�12 The U�S� military deployed a total of around 1,600 short-range 
tactical aircraft that operated from in-theater air bases and six U�S� Navy (USN) 
aircraft carriers stationed in littoral waters�13 Long-range, precision-guided mu-
nitions accounted for around 5 percent of all air-to-ground ordnance delivered, 
supported by around sixteen Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites�14 U�S� 
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military satellite constellations also gathered intelligence and provided global 
communications�15
The PLA keenly observed the 1991 Gulf War, particularly American exploita-
tion of conventional, long-range, precision strikes�16 The PLA also observed how 
two USN carrier strike groups intervened during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis� 
Both developments highlighted the PLA’s technological inferiority and inability 
to prevent USN sea power from threatening the Chinese mainland�17 In response, 
the PLA has developed a “counterintervention strategy,” designed specifically to 
negate traditional U�S� advantages in global force projection� The core problem is 
that the PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to undermine the 
U�S� military’s credibility to deter and defeat state aggressors—thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a China-U�S� armed conflict�
PLA COUNTERINTERVENTION STRATEGY
Strategically, the PLA is tasked with using its counterintervention strategy to 
deter the United States and deny the U�S� military access to the western Pacific� 
The primary purpose of this strategy is to provide the Chinese government with 
the ability to isolate and coerce U�S� allies or regional countries to accept Chinese 
sovereignty demands in a number of territorial disputes�18 The PLA might be 
directed to apply this counterintervention strategy in relation to the disputed 
sovereignty over Taiwan, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China 
Sea�19
The PLA’s counterintervention strategy requires four main types of military 
operations: theater strike, denial of service, antiaccess, and area-denial operations� 
Ideally, all four types of operations would be carried out simultaneously; howev-
er, the PLA’s finite resources might force it to prioritize� If the PLA were forced to 
prioritize, it would place the greatest emphasis on neutralizing forward-deployed 
U�S� forces, followed by denying critical services to the U�S� military, followed by 
activities to prevent the U�S� military from reinforcing the Pacific theater� Theater- 
strike operations would be required to disable or destroy forward-deployed U�S� 
military assets, including aircraft, ships, and submarines, in addition to infra-
structure at U�S� bases located west of Pearl Harbor�20 Strikes against these targets 
would be executed rapidly at the outset of a conflict to catch adversaries unpre-
pared and achieve decisive in-theater superiority�21 
In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate 
service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)� PLAN submarines would execute 
undersea attacks against U�S� ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at 
land targets with cruise missiles�22 The PLAAF would execute air strikes against 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   37 2/25/19   10:40 AM
3
Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
U�S� aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U�S� ships and submarines in 
port or at sea� Strikes against U�S� bases would occur with extended-range mis-
siles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles 
launched from the Chinese mainland�23
PLAAF combat aircraft can deliver antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) out to 
two thousand kilometers (km) from the Chinese mainland, and PLAAF H-6 
long-range bombers can deliver land-attack cruise missiles out to 3,300 km from 
the Chinese mainland� Air-launched cruise missiles would be supplemented by 
PLARF conventional ballistic missiles� The PLARF’s DF-16 short-range ballistic 
missile would strike land targets at a range of around eight hundred kilometers� 
The PLARF’s DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) would strike land 
targets or moving ships in the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) configu-
ration at a range of around 1,500 km�24 The PLARF’s DF-26 intermediate-range 
ballistic missile (IRBM) would strike land targets or moving ships in the ASBM 
configuration at ranges around three thousand kilometers�25
Denial-of-service operations would aim at denying the United States unfet-
tered use of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure�26 Successful PLA 
denial-of-service operations would hinder the U�S� military’s ability to execute 
land-attack strikes from USN submarines in the western Pacific, receive up-to-
date intelligence from USN submarines on patrol, marshal combat resources 
to reinforce the Pacific theater, and communicate with surviving U�S� forces in 
the western Pacific� One method would be for the PLA to apply its antisatellite 
(ASAT) technologies to incapacitate, disrupt, or destroy U�S� military satellite 
constellations used for global communications, satellite navigation, and intel-
ligence gathering�27 PLA ASAT technologies include lasers, microwave technolo-
gies, and hard-kill methodologies�28 Cyberwarfare capabilities also provide the 
PLA with a sophisticated method to disrupt or deny the U�S� military’s use of its 
C4ISR infrastructure�29
Antiaccess operations would degrade or deny USAF and USN force- 
projection capabilities for accessing the western Pacific, thus isolating U�S� al-
lies�30 Denying USN seaborne force-projection capabilities would be a priority 
because over 90 percent of all U�S� military assets, stores, and equipment are 
transported by sea�31 PLA antiaccess operations would force USN task forces to 
run a gauntlet of layered offensive PLA capabilities during the approach to the 
western Pacific�32 Surviving USN task forces likely would arrive in theater with 
depleted missile magazines, having suffered fleet-wide damage or ship losses, or 
both, just to come within range of the Chinese mainland� Weapons and vessels 
available for Chinese antiaccess operations include DF-21D ASBMs, potentially 
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DF-26 ASBMs, air-launched ASCMs, diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack 
submarines, and surface combatants�33
U�S� airpower also could be denied access to the western Pacific through the 
deployment of PLAN aircraft carrier battle groups� Other options might include 
arming PLAN nuclear-powered attack submarines with submarine-launched, an-
tiair missiles to shoot down USAF in-flight refueling tankers and cargo-transport 
aircraft� Concurrently, some PLA units would aim to interdict U�S� follow-on 
forces outside the western Pacific, particularly in Hawaii and Australia, with the 
aim of harassing and interfering with the deployment of U�S� and allied forces 
into theater�34
Area-denial operations would be required to limit the freedom of maneuver of 
air or maritime forces in coastal areas close to the Chinese mainland� PLA capa-
bilities that could be used for area-denial operations include advanced sea mines, 
diesel-electric submarines, maritime strike aircraft, surface combatants, Type 
022 missile patrol boats armed with ASCMs, coastal ASCM batteries, land-based 
air-defense systems, and land-based conventional and rocket artillery batteries�35
PLA PASSIVE DEFENSES
Concurrently, the PLA has invested in three types of passive-defense capabilities 
designed specifically to enable continuity of PLA conventional and nuclear war-
fighting capabilities, even if the Chinese mainland comes under heavy attack� 
PLA passive-defense capabilities include land-based sensor networks; land-based 
command, control, and communications (C3) networks; and hardened facilities�
First, the PLA has invested in extensive land-based sensor networks to provide 
persistent wide-area surveillance of the western Pacific to enable PLA land-
based, long-range strike capabilities� The PLA uses land-based Skywave over-the-
horizon (OTH) radar technology to track aircraft and ships at ranges of several 
thousand kilometers from the Chinese mainland�36 The PLA uses Surfacewave 
OTH radar arrays to track aircraft and ships at long ranges from the Chinese 
mainland�37 These capabilities are being augmented with other infrared, pulsed-
Doppler radar, phased-array radar, and passive radar detection technologies�38 
The PLA uses passive undersea sensors to detect and track submarines operating 
within Chinese littoral waters�39 The PLA’s land-based intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are augmented by PLAAF airborne warn-
ing and control system aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ISR satellites�40
Second, the PLA has invested in survivable, land-based C3 systems designed 
specifically to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy to retain basic 
C3 functions over all PLA branches, even while under heavy attack�41 PLA 
C3 systems include underground fiber-optic cables; microwave relays; and 
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long-range, high-frequency radio technologies augmented by civilian commu-
nication channels�42
Third, the PLA has invested heavily in aboveground hardened structures 
(HSs), shallow-underground HSs, deep-underground HSs, and strategic hard 
and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) (see table 1)� The purpose of these hardened 
facilities is to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy, strategic assets, 
and other key capabilities such as logistics to survive and remain operational, 
even after a nuclear strike�43 The PLA has invested in strategic HDBTs to protect 
the Chinese national command hierarchy in the event of an armed conflict�44 
These HDBTs are connected to the outside world through extensive land-based 
communications networks that enable the Chinese national command hierarchy 
to remain in command of its sea, air, and land forces�45 
The PLARF has an extensive network of hardened tunnels and facilities buried 
deep underground and within mountains that can protect land-based strategic 
assets such as road-mobile ballistic missiles, launchers, and PLARF personnel�46 
Some reports indicate that the PLARF has 4,856 kilometers of such hardened 
and deeply buried tunnels, some as deep as one thousand meters� The tunnels 
form part of an extensive underground web of HDBT facilities and are serviced 
by internal transport or train networks that move ordnance and launchers� These 
facilities have surface-level entrances where the missile transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) can access surface-level launchpads�47
The PLAAF has hardened its air bases to protect its combat aircraft�48 PLAAF 
air bases feature hardened aboveground HSs, such as aircraft hangars, with re-
inforced concrete protection estimated to be between 0�9 and 1�2 meters thick� 




Aboveground HS: aboveground facilities or structures that are protected from ki-
netic and air-blast weapons effects because of their aerodynamic shape that deflects 
blast waves—typically covered with earth and reinforced concretea
Shallow-underground HS: underground facilities or structures up to twenty meters 
below the earth’s surface 
Deep-underground HS: underground facilities or structures twenty or more meters 
below the earth’s surface 
Hard and deeply buried target
(HDBT)
Underground facilities one to seven hundred meters below the earth’s surface that 
protect a country’s national command structure, critical activities, equipment, 
personnel, or strategic military response options from nuclear weapons effects 
TABLE 1
TYPES OF HARD TARGETS
 Note:
 a. National Research Council of the National Academies, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2005), p. 14.
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storage facilities� Some of the PLAAF underground HSs are very large, provided 
with multiple entrances, constructed inside mountains, and covered by anywhere 
from twenty to sixty meters of concrete, dirt, and rock� Other passive measures 
include revetments between parked aircraft and long paved areas that can be 
used as emergency runways, as well as multiple points of access for runways� 
These measures usually are augmented by advanced camouflage and advanced 
air-defense systems�49
The PLAN also has constructed extensive underground HSs to protect its 
submarine forces, accessed by sea-level tunnels in coastal areas� These facilities 
offer PLA submarines the ability to deploy covertly and return without being vis-
ible to U�S� overhead surveillance capabilities�50 The PLAN naval base on Hainan 
Island currently is equipped with hardened underground submarine facilities of 
this nature�51 The PLAN also plans to construct a significantly larger and more 
modern underground HS naval base sufficient to protect and house its nuclear-
powered, ballistic-missile submarines�52
PLA CONVENTIONAL FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY
The PLA’s most significant counterintervention capability is its inventory of long-
range conventional ballistic missiles, particularly given that the U�S� military does 
not field an equivalent capability� PLA DF-21 MRBMs and ASBMs have ranges 
around 1,500 km; PLA DF-26 IRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around three 
thousand kilometers� It is also important to note that the PLA currently possesses 
between two and three hundred MRBMs and likely will expand this inventory 
with the introduction of the DF-26� The long range and growing inventory of 
PLA conventional ballistic missiles would force relatively slow U�S� maritime as-
sets to run a lethal gauntlet of PLA ASBMs while they are unable to return fire 
and degrade the threat�53
The U�S� Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that the PLA’s conventional 
ballistic missiles use maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) equipped with 
infrared and radar seekers, enabling PLA ballistic missiles to acquire fixed or 
moving targets during the terminal phase of flight� PLA MARVs are difficult 
opponents because of their significant agility and high reentry speeds (around 
Mach 12), as well as electronic warfare, decoy, chaff, and flare countermeasures�54
PLA conventional ballistic missiles have the potential to carry submunitions 
warheads capable of inflicting wide-area destruction, which increases their threat 
profile�55 Against fixed land targets, however, MARV penetrator warheads pro-
vide the capability to inflict serious damage to hardened targets�56 MARV pen-
etrator warheads could sink USN ships outright, whereas submunitions warheads 
could inflict a range of damage to them�57 For instance, aircraft carrier flight 
decks, arresting gear, catapults, and landing signal systems could be damaged, 
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thereby preventing flight operations.58 Similarly, USN cruisers and destroyers 
could suffer damage to phased-array radar panels and Mk 41 vertical launch-
ing system (VLS) missile batteries. Damage of either type likely would result in 
a “mission kill,” rendering the damaged ship unfit to fight. The predicted high 
lethality and significant impact of PLA conventional ballistic missiles pose a seri-
ous challenge to the survivability of U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific 
and thus to U.S. force-projection capabilities.
The PLA’s unmatched conventional ballistic-missile arsenal and rapidly evolv-
ing military capabilities, combined with a perception of relative invulnerability to 
U.S. retaliatory strikes, could lure Chinese leaders into a belief that a conventional 
first strike might deliver temporary PLA regional superiority, during which time 
Chinese leaders could settle regional disputes coercively, on their terms.59 A 
perception of PLA superiority in a conventional theater strike is not helped by 
the U.S. military’s apparent lack of a strategy outlining a credible response to an 
overwhelming PLA conventional first strike.60 Without clear U.S. deterrence, the 
risk of miscalculation only will increase—particularly as the PLA’s confidence in 
its own capabilities grows in future decades.61
TOWARD A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
The Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) maintained rela-
tive stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.62 Underpinning 
MAD was the knowledge that both sides possessed credible nuclear second-
strike capabilities—the ability to absorb a nuclear first strike and still retain 
sufficient operable capability to respond with unacceptable devastation.63 This 
understanding provided a relative degree of stability, since both sides clearly 
understood their mutual vulnerability and that any preemptive nuclear first 
strike would receive a response in kind.64 Using Cold War deterrence theory as 
an underlying basis, this article advocates that the U.S. military should consider 
introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the 
PLA’s counterintervention strategy. The purpose would be to provide the U.S. 
military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and, 
if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces, 
to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.
Strategically, a U.S. conventional access strategy would provide Chinese lead-
ers with a clearer understanding of how the U.S. military can impose costs on 
China, even in the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike. Operationally, it 
would increase the permissiveness of the western Pacific for forward-deployed 
and follow-on U.S. forces. The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access 
Concept (JOAC) states that “in-range combat forces at the beginning of a crisis 
can facilitate operational access” for other forces in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/
7270_Goldsmith.indd   42 2/27/19   2:56 PM
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5
 G O L D S M I T H  4 3
AD) environments�65 The primary operational objective of a U�S� conventional 
access strategy would be to degrade the effectiveness of the PLA’s conventional 
strike capability, as opposed to seeking its complete eradication, so as to facilitate 
access for U�S� forces entering the western Pacific� The JOAC states that the U�S� 
military must be able to strike deep into enemy A2/AD capability networks to 
“disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive system” and that preferred targets 
include “logistics and command and control nodes, long range firing units and 
strategic and operational reserves�”66 The secondary operational objective would 
be to deny the PLA unfettered use of communications, logistics, and transport 
capabilities such as airfields, airports, ports, rail networks, land-based C4ISR 
networks, and fuel or ordnance stocks� By degrading PLA strike and war-fighting 
capabilities, forward-deployed U�S� forces could increase the permissiveness of 
the western Pacific for U�S� forces arriving in theater�
A U�S� conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities� 
A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forward-
deployed U�S� forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes� A conventional 
theater-strike capability would enable the U�S� military to begin degrading PLA 
capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight 
refueling tankers or usable runways� A theater-recovery capability would restore 
basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes� A rapid-
response capability would allow long-range USAF bombers and fighter escorts to 
deploy rapidly to U�S� bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired 
runways as well as pre-positioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earth-
penetrating ordnance�
Theater-Wide Passive-Defense Capability
The PLA aims to be capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hyper-
sonic boost-glide (HBG) missiles by 2020 and capable of striking at interconti-
nental distances with hypersonic aircraft by 2025�67 The 2013 Air-Sea Battle Con-
cept (ASBC) states that in a future armed conflict, U�S� bases could be attacked 
and that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a sanctuary�”68 Both factors 
indicate that the United States should consider hardening its infrastructure in the 
western Pacific and at key locations across Hawaii and the continental United 
States, so as to deny any adversary a relatively easy way to degrade or deny U�S� 
force-projection capabilities�
Within this context, a theater-wide passive-defense capability would require 
improvements in the hardening of critical fixed sites to withstand kinetic threats, 
and the hardening of critical C4ISR systems to resist nonkinetic strikes� Hard-
ening of critical fixed sites might include building aboveground HS submarine 
pens, aboveground HS aircraft shelters, and deep-underground HS fuel- and 
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ordnance-storage facilities, as well as deep-underground HS or HDBT shelters 
for theater-strike missiles, personnel, and base-repair kits� A 2007 study from 
the RAND Corporation notes that major U�S� forward bases should protect their 
in-theater fuel stocks in underground HSs and that stores should be sufficient 
to enable several weeks of high-intensity air operations�69 Hardening of critical 
C4ISR systems might include the protection of base computer networks and 
electronic infrastructure from the effects of cyber, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 
and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon effects� At the bare minimum, 
such improvements in hardened infrastructure should be rolled out across all 
U�S� bases in the western Pacific� It also might be desirable for the U�S� military to 
consider selectively rolling out similar hardened infrastructure packages across 
key Hawaiian and mainland installations, such as Pearl Harbor and San Diego�
Conventional Theater-Strike Capability
A conventional theater-strike capability would allow forward-deployed U�S� 
forces to respond within minutes or hours of a PLA conventional first strike� A 
U�S� conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U�S� military to begin 
degrading PLA strike and C4ISR capabilities at the outset of a conflict, even if 
U�S� bases, air assets, and naval assets were destroyed or otherwise unavailable� 
A conventional theater-strike capability should consist of theater-strike missiles, 
hypersonic undersea strike missiles, ASAT weapons, cyberstrike weapons, and 
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs)� As mentioned earlier, the purpose of 
such strikes would not be to destroy these capabilities outright but to degrade 
PLA strike and war-fighting capabilities, thereby achieving the JOAC objective 
of helping ensure access for follow-on U�S� forces attempting to enter the theater 
of operations�70
Theater-Strike Missiles. Theater-strike missiles would enable forward-deployed 
U�S� forces to execute conventional strikes against heavily defended targets on the 
Chinese mainland, without support from in-flight refueling tankers or in-theater 
runway access� Conventional missile strikes could take place in immediate re-
sponse to, or in the aftermath of, a PLA conventional first strike� For U�S� bases 
to retain a credible conventional theater-strike capability, theater-strike missiles 
would have to be stored in hardened facilities�
One option might be road-mobile IRBMs with conventional warheads and 
a range of 5,500 km, sufficient to strike at Haixi City in Qinghai Province from 
Guam or the Cocos Islands� Another option might be an HBG missile with in-
tercontinental or intermediate range, consisting of a rocket booster stack and 
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)�71 After the boost phase, the HGV would exhibit 
a limited ballistic trajectory before sharply reentering the atmosphere, followed 
by the HGV’s transition into a high-altitude glide phase of flight to the intended 
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target�72 The United States is developing an HGV that can be deployed from a 
modified USAF intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rocket booster�73 Either 
option could carry a variety of conventional warheads, including penetrators for 
hardened targets, submunitions for wide-area destruction, and EMP or HPM 
warheads to cripple electronic infrastructure�
HGVs could exploit hypersonic terminal speeds and combine with exist-
ing conventional penetrator technology to threaten PLA HSs� The GBU-39 is 
a small-diameter bomb that weighs 130 kilograms (kg) and can penetrate over 
four meters of reinforced concrete�74 The GBU-28 is a 2,268 kg bomb capable of 
penetrating over thirty meters of earth or over six meters of reinforced concrete�75 
The GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) weighs 13,600 kg and is ca-
pable of penetrating over sixty meters of five-thousand-pounds-per-square-inch 
reinforced concrete�76 One option is for theater-strike missile HGVs to deploy 
existing GBU-39 ordnance, as GBU-28 and GBU-57 ordnance is too large and 
heavy� The other option is for the United States to develop a new penetrator that 
combines hypersonic speeds with the GBU-57’s penetration technology, which 
would be sufficient to threaten all grades of HSs up to one hundred meters be-
low the earth’s surface� Using GBU-39 technology could provide HBG theater-
strike missiles with the ability to neutralize aboveground HSs, such as ordnance 
magazines and hardened aircraft shelters, and also to inflict heavy damage to 
paved areas necessary for flight operations� Using the GBU-28 technology could 
provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize all grades of shallow- 
underground HSs and some grades of deep-underground HSs� Using the GBU-
57 technology could provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize 
most grades of deep-underground HSs�
HBG theater-strike missiles ideally should be capable of being launched from 
road-mobile TELs� Road-mobile HBG strike missiles would enable forward-
deployed U�S� bases, such as Guam, to protect ordnance and launchers from 
PLA conventional strikes in HDBT facilities� After a PLA conventional strike, 
the TELs could be driven out of their hardened facilities and launched� Road-
mobile weapons also would increase the tactical survivability of deployed TELs, 
as they would be better dispersed and camouflaged compared with fixed missile 
batteries�
HBG theater-strike missiles should be used to target the weakest points of PLA 
hardened facilities and infrastructure� Typically, these will be a hardened facility’s 
communication links to the outside world and the surface-level entrances� The 
reason for attacking entrances is that every underground hardened facility, by its 
very nature, will have some surface-level access point� This is a vulnerability that 
can be exploited by U�S� HBG theater-strike missiles to collapse the entrances to 
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PLA hardened facilities, sealing all personnel and ordnance inside, or at the very 
least impeding the movement of PLA assets in and out of the facility� In the case 
of PLA HSs inside mountains, surface-level entrances would be vulnerable to 
landslides, which could be triggered by U�S� HBG warhead detonations higher 
up the mountain� However, the main problem with targeting the entrances of 
PLA HSs is that they are likely to be camouflaged and “virtually undetectable by 
current imagery assets�”77 Locating a significant portion of PLA hardened facility 
entrances would require years of dedicated intelligence gathering by the entire 
U�S� Intelligence Community, using its wide array of collection techniques�
Hypersonic Undersea Strike Missiles. Hypersonic undersea strike missiles would 
enable forward-deployed U�S� forces to strike at heavily defended but not hard-
ened targets across the Chinese mainland� Prime targets would include but not be 
limited to Chinese civilian airports, military airstrips, military and civilian ports, 
electrical power grids, communications nodes, and fuel depots� The purpose of 
striking at these targets would be to deny the PLA unfettered use of these facili-
ties, which otherwise could be exploited to enhance PLA operations�
Until the project’s apparent termination, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (known as DARPA) was developing the Arclight HBG weapon, 
designed around the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 booster stack and designed to 
achieve full compatibility with strike-length Mk 41 VLS naval batteries� Arclight 
was built to deliver an HGV payload with a total mass of 45–90 kg out to a range 
of 3,700 km in less than thirty minutes�78 Although budget reports suggest that 
the Arclight program has been terminated, it does provide insight into the types 
of capabilities that might be feasible�
Any future hypersonic undersea strike missile would need to be fully compat-
ible with the U�S� Navy’s undersea wide-diameter payload tubes, which measure 
2�2 meters in diameter and currently store seven UGM-109E Tomahawk land-
attack missiles�79 Ideally, a future hypersonic undersea strike missile also would 
be fully compatible with strike-length Mk 41 VLS cells� Full compatibility with 
both launching systems would enable the same missile design to be supported by 
Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), Virginia-class nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs), and Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided-
missile submarines�
Undersea towed payload modules (TPMs) are another launch option for fu-
ture USN undersea strike weapons� TPMs essentially are containers fitted with 
vertically launched undersea ordnance that would be submerged and towed by 
submarines into theater�80 TPMs are the most attractive option for several rea-
sons� First, TPMs lack the expensive crew life support, hotel loads, fuel storage, 
and propulsion systems of surface combatants and submarines, and they can be 
acquired in large numbers� Second, TPMs could be pre-positioned in littoral 
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waters near Guam years in advance of any conflict� Third, targeting data could 
be uploaded by the towing submarine into a TPM computer system prior to 
launch� An onboard TPM computer system would enable the TPM to activate 
on a time delay, giving the towing submarine time to escape the area before the 
TPM launch cycle compromised its location� At the outbreak of hostilities, one or 
more submarines could tow the pre-positioned TPMs to within striking distance 
of the Chinese mainland�
Antisatellite Strike and Cyberstrike Weapons. ASAT strike weapons would en-
able the U�S� military to neutralize Chinese military and civilian satellite constel-
lations rapidly�81 Similarly, cyberstrike capabilities would enable the U�S� military 
to degrade the effectiveness of PLA C4ISR networks� These targets would be a 
high priority for the United States since PLA counterintervention capabilities rely 
on space-based assets to enhance OTH targeting of U�S� bases and moving ships 
at sea�82 In theater, ASAT capabilities are launched from ground-based missile 
launchers� Out of theater, ASAT capabilities enter by way of destroyer-launched 
ordnance�
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Long-range AUVs with large conventional 
warheads would enable forward-deployed U�S� forces to strike at Chinese port 
infrastructure, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens accessed 
by sea-level undersea tunnels� Notice that only the entrance to a PLA hardened 
sea-level tunnel would need to be sealed or rendered impassable to generate a 
mission-kill effect and trap any submarines inside the PLA undersea facility�
Boeing’s Echo Voyager unmanned undersea vehicle measures 2�6 by 2�6 by 
15�5 meters, is fully autonomous, and has a range of around 12,038 km� It also 
has a maximum diving depth of three thousand meters and seagoing endurance 
of several months, is fitted with non-GPS navigation technologies, and is capable 
of carrying very large payloads of up to eight tons, with a total internal space of 
14�75 square meters� The Boeing Echo Voyager uses an inertial navigation system 
(INS), Doppler velocity logs (DVLs), depth sensors, and various other technolo-
gies to navigate independent of GPS satellite navigation constellations� Given the 
exceptional range, seagoing endurance, diving depth, GPS-independent naviga-
tion technologies, and large payload, Boeing’s Echo Voyager could be an ideal 
baseline from which to build an AUV tailored specifically for neutralizing or 
rendering inoperable Chinese ports, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened subma-
rine pens, particularly by attacking sea-level tunnel entrances� To ensure the sur-
vivability of AUVs from PLA conventional strikes, AUVs should be submerged 
in littoral waters close to shore, or alternatively stored in hardened underground 
facilities ashore�83
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The PLA has invested extensively in capabilities to deny U�S� forces access to 
satellite-based C4ISR and GPS navigation systems, particularly given its percep-
tion that space-based satellite constellations are a major vulnerability�84 Conse-
quently, a credible U�S� conventional theater-strike capability would need to be 
capable of functioning in denied war-fighting environments� In practical terms, 
this means that HBG theater-strike missiles, Arclight HBG weapons, ASAT 
weapons, and AUVs must be capable of executing their respective roles without 
access to last-minute intelligence from C4ISR, space-based communications 
systems, and space-based navigation systems� Instead, all these proposed con-
ventional theater-strike capabilities should rely on high-end autonomous navi-
gation systems (ANSs)� ANSs might include INSs fitted with advanced-inertial- 
measurement-unit components, DVLs, and advanced computing systems�85
Because of the threat that PLA kinetic and nonkinetic strikes pose against 
C4ISR capabilities, at the outset of a conflict forward-deployed U�S� forces may 
not have access to late-minute intelligence�86 Furthermore, computer networks 
containing critical information might be disabled or destroyed� As a contingency, 
the United States could deliver hard-copy intelligence packets with targeting data 
to forward-deployed forces� This would enable forward-deployed forces to target 
at least China’s fixed land and coastal targets, even if C4ISR is unavailable�
Theater-Recovery Capability
A theater-recovery capability would enable the U�S� military to regain use of its 
in-theater bases and space-based infrastructure after a PLA conventional first 
strike� Central to this capability would be the ability to repair damage to bases by 
relying only on resources forward deployed at each base, resources deployed by 
assets that would not require runway access, or both� A theater-recovery capabil-
ity would consist of hardened in-theater facilities, pre-positioned air-base-repair 
kits and machinery, airdrop repair teams, airships, and microsatellite launches�
Hardened facilities would shield personnel, supplies, repair kits, and reserve 
air- and missile-defense (AMD) systems from a PLA conventional first strike� 
Ideally, hardened facilities would be buried deep underground� Airdrop repair 
teams would enable the U�S� military to repair damaged runways at bases with-
out requiring USAF C-5 and C-17 airlifters to land� The USAF maintains prime 
base engineer emergency force (Prime BEEF) units that execute on-site repairs, 
largely using equipment and stores located at each base� Prime BEEF units are 
supplemented by USAF rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair 
squadron engineer (RED HORSE) units, which specialize in repairing air bases 
under combat conditions� RED HORSE units can be air-dropped into distant 
locations, and they aim to be capable of operating without support for limited 
durations�87 
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If current heavy machinery is too heavy or bulky to be air-dropped and a 
PLA conventional first strike were to render most on-base heavy repair equip-
ment unusable, it would be more difficult for air-dropped RED HORSE teams to 
repair major damage such as large-diameter craters� One solution might be for 
the USAF to develop a suite of custom, lightweight, facility-repair machines that 
could be air-dropped, along with RED HORSE units and supporting stores, into 
theater from C-5 and C-17 airlifters�
Large-payload airships would bolster repair capabilities without use of run-
ways� An extended-range variant of the Lockheed Martin P-791 hybrid airship 
could fulfill such a role; the current version has a range of 2,592 km carrying a 
payload of 21,000 kg�88 To reach Guam, an extended-range P-791 would need a 
range of around 3,300 km to deploy nonstop from Darwin Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) air base, in northern Australia� Alternatively, an existing P-791 
airship could island-hop from Wheeler Army Airfield on Oahu to Midway Atoll 
(around 2,087 km), from Midway to Wake Atoll (around 1,900 km), and from 
Wake Atoll to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam (around 2,400 km)�
Microsatellite launches would enable the United States rapidly to supplement 
or replace USAF navigation, communications, and intelligence satellites lost to 
PLA ASAT strikes�89 The airborne launch assist space access (ALASA) vehicle, 
as deployed from USAF fourth-generation aircraft, could fill this role, given its 
ability to launch several microsatellites at short notice�90
Rapid-Response Capability
In the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike, runways on Guam and other 
U�S� islands in the western Pacific likely would be inoperable, at least until re-
paired by Prime BEEF or RED HORSE teams� After initial repairs were complete, 
the United States could fly long-range stealth bombers into theater, from Hawaii 
and the U�S� mainland, so as to execute long-range conventional strikes against 
hardened targets across the Chinese mainland� The pre-positioning of GBU-57 
ordnance in HDBTs on Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands would signifi-
cantly enhance a USAF rapid-response capability, as the logistics burden would 
be greatly alleviated�
USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bombers have an unrefueled combat radius of around 
5,500 km�91 However, the USAF inventory contains only twenty B-2s, as the 
acquisition program was reduced significantly from an original order of 132 
aircraft�92 The USAF also is replacing its legacy B-1B and B-52H bomber fleets 
with one hundred B-21 Raider long-range stealth bombers�93 However, the 
B-21 Raider could have an unrefueled combat radius as short as 4,600 km— 
significantly shorter than the B-1B at 6,900 km and the B-52H at 8,100 km�94 
Assuming that the B-21 Raider has a combat radius of at least 5,500 km, both 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   49 2/25/19   10:40 AM
15
Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 5 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
B-2s and B-21s would be capable of executing deep strikes across the Chinese 
mainland without access to in-flight refueling—as deep as Haixi City from Guam 
or the Cocos Islands� Both the B-2 and B-21 can deliver the enormous GBU-57 
MOP, which measures eighty centimeters in diameter by 6�25 meters in length 
and weighs 13,600 kg per bomb� The B-2 is capable of carrying two GBU-57 
MOPs, one in each internal weapons bay�95
If a PLA conventional first strike denied use of runways on Guam and the Co-
cos Islands, USAF B-2s and B-21s could operate from the RAAF Learmonth air 
base, in western Australia, outside the range of most PLA conventional strike ca-
pabilities�96 Assuming the B-21 Raider has an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 
km, USAF B-2s and B-21s operating from RAAF Learmonth could be refueled 
from RAAF in-flight refueling tankers orbiting the Cocos Islands, followed by 
strikes out to 5,500 km� The return journey would be the mirror opposite, with 
in-flight refueling above the Cocos Islands before returning to RAAF Learmonth� 
The advantage of this option is that it would depend only on in-flight refueling 
tankers and RAAF air bases outside the range of most PLA conventional strike 
capabilities, and thus would provide a robust contingency plan�97
However, a fleet of 120 long-range stealthy bombers (twenty B-2s and one 
hundred B-21s) is unlikely to meet the U�S� military’s operational needs during a 
China-U�S� conflict, for several reasons� First, the high number of targets across 
the Chinese mainland, exacerbated by the significant distance from Guam, will 
reduce drastically the fleet-wide sortie rate—the number of targets that a bomber 
can strike per twenty-four-hour period�98 Second, only a fraction of the entire 
fleet will be available for combat operations, as the rest will be needed for train-
ing, maintenance, and reserve functions�99 For instance, a combat-coded force of 
160 B-21 Raiders would require an overall fleet of two hundred aircraft�100 Third, 
the B-2s and B-21s would play a disproportionate role in the air war portion of 
any China-U�S� conflict�101 This is because B-2s and B-21s would be the only 
aircraft in the USAF inventory with sufficient stealth to penetrate advanced PLA 
air defenses; sufficient unrefueled range to strike at the Chinese mainland from 
Guam, without depending on in-flight refueling tankers; and sufficient payload 
to carry the GBU-57 MOP for neutralizing PLA HSs� In 2015, the Mitchell Insti-
tute for Aerospace Studies found that the USAF might require a total fleet of two 
hundred stealthy long-range bombers, particularly given reduced sortie rates, 
combat coding, payloads, and the risk of force attrition�102
INVENTORY ESTIMATES
During any armed conflict nothing ever works perfectly or goes entirely accord-
ing to plan� As Clausewitz once stated, this concept of “friction” means that the 
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outcome of military operations is inherently uncertain and that any element of a 
plan can fail�103 In the cases of conventional theater-strike, theater-recovery, and 
rapid-response operations, the United States would need to consider how many 
stores of various types are sufficient to respond to operational uncertainties that 
might arise� For instance, conventional theater-strike capabilities could exhaust 
in-theater ordnance stores, theater-recovery capabilities could run out of base-
repair kits, and a rapid-response capability could run out of in-theater ground-
penetrating ordnance�
To insulate against operational uncertainties, U�S� forward bases would need 
large pre-positioned inventories of theater-strike missiles sufficient for at least 
two strikes per PLA target� This estimate of two strikes per PLA target is based 
on the RAND Corporation’s assessment that two weapons per hard target would 
be needed to generate a kill probability of greater than 90 percent�104 In addi-
tion, the U�S� military would need to retain a strategic reserve of ordnance, in 
the event that in-theater stores were exhausted, as well as for use in other global 
contingencies�
For the theater-recovery capability, U�S� forward bases likely would need very 
large inventories of base-repair kits and ALASA ordnance with microsatellite 
payloads pre-positioned and sufficient to execute two full base repairs or ALASA 
salvos, plus strategic reserves at mainland facilities for an additional four full base 
repairs and four ALASA salvos� These reserves might be necessary if the PLA 
executes persistent strikes and ASAT attacks throughout a protracted conflict�105
A rapid-response capability might need very large inventories of pre- 
positioned GBU-57 MOP ordnance and aviation fuel, in shallow-underground 
HS facilities at U�S� forward bases� This might require sufficient ordnance for two 
strikes per PLA target, plus a strategic reserve for further combat sorties or use 
in other global contingencies�
ADVANTAGES OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would provide six major advantages� The first is 
that it would deny the PLA a conventional first-strike capability against U�S� bases 
and forward-deployed forces, through passive-defense measures, a conventional 
theater-strike capability, a theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capa-
bility� With passive hardening of critical military infrastructure, a greater portion 
of U�S� forces might survive the initial waves of PLA conventional strikes� Surviv-
ing in-theater forces could then execute land-based, undersea, ASAT, and AUV 
strikes against a variety of PLA targets, across the Chinese mainland and in orbit� 
This would enable the U�S� military to begin degrading the PLA’s capabilities at 
the outset of a conflict, enabling theater-recovery capabilities to operate more 
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effectively� With airfields repaired, B-21 and B-2 stealth bombers could then be 
flown into theater to commence strikes against PLA targets across the Chinese 
mainland�
The second advantage is that degrading PLA conventional strike capabilities 
at the outset of a conflict would increase the permissiveness of the entire theater 
for other force-projection assets� Undermining the PLA’s capability to execute 
ASBM and ASCM strikes against USN task forces and logistics ships would pro-
vide USN assets with greater freedom of action and enhanced survivability� With 
intense and persistent conventional strikes, PLA capabilities might be degraded 
sufficiently to enable USN aircraft carriers eventually to operate with relative 
impunity close to the Chinese coastline, significantly increasing the sorties gen-
erated by carrier air wings�
The third advantage is that it would buy time for U�S� force-projection capa-
bilities to be mobilized, marshaled, and deployed to the western Pacific� With 
significant air and naval assets deployed globally, the military would require time 
to redeploy and logistically support a significant force in theater� For example, a 
1993 General Accounting Office report stated that with a total projected force of 
twelve USN aircraft carriers, six carriers could deploy with thirty days’ notice and 
nine carriers with sixty days’ notice�106 Equivalent times likely would be required 
to deploy or redeploy the full range of U�S� air, land, and sea assets necessary to 
execute theater-wide, joint-service campaigns in the Pacific�
The fourth advantage is that it would focus the military’s attention on criti-
cal capabilities needed to enhance the survivability and operational effective-
ness of traditional force-projection assets: tactical aircraft, in-flight refueling 
tankers, aircraft carriers, surface combatants, logistics ships, and sealift ships� 
For instance, prioritizing long-range strike capabilities not dependent on U�S� 
bases or in-flight refueling would in turn drive the military to prioritize conven-
tional theater-strike missiles, undersea-launched hypersonic missiles, ASAT and 
cyberstrike weapons, and AUVs, combined with a large fleet of B-21s with range 
similar to the B-2 Spirit�
The fifth advantage is that a credible U�S� conventional theater-strike capabili-
ty would force the PLA to reevaluate its allocation of resources to offensive versus 
defensive systems� The PLA might be driven to divert sizable defense funding to 
harden its vulnerabilities further across the vast Chinese mainland and improve 
costly AMD systems� This would reduce the funding available for the PLA to 
pursue offensive war-fighting systems�
The sixth advantage is that a U�S� capacity to execute a conventional theater 
strike from the Cocos Islands would complicate significantly the PLA’s opera-
tions to defend the Chinese mainland� During a South China Sea or East China 
Sea crisis, the PLA could deploy most of its AMD systems along China’s east and 
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southeast coastlines� However, if the Australian government allowed the U�S� 
military to operate conventional B-21s or HBG theater-strike missiles from the 
Cocos Islands, the PLA would have to defend a significantly greater area� For 
instance, PLA AMD units would have to be more thinly dispersed along China’s 
vast coastline as well as along the land borders of its Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yun-
nan provinces� Consequently, U�S� strike bombers and theater-strike missiles 
would have an improved capability to penetrate PLA AMD networks and neu-
tralize the intended targets�
LIMITATIONS OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would incur seven major limitations�
Homeland Sanctuary
The first limitation is the vexing issue of homeland sanctuary: the concept that 
nuclear powers refrain from attacking the homelands of other nuclear powers, to 
avoid triggering a nuclear response� The argument is that in a China-U�S� conflict 
each side would initially avoid strikes against the other’s homeland, even with 
conventional ordnance, to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation�107 It has been 
pointed out that this asymmetry could allow China to strike at U�S� territories in 
the western Pacific, such as Guam and the Northern Marianas, without retalia-
tory U�S� strikes on the PLARF and Chinese mainland—at least initially�
Four problems arise out of this argument� First, forward-deployed U�S� forces 
at overseas territories such as Guam and the Northern Marianas are likely to be 
heavily inundated by barrages of PLA ordnance in the initial phase of any China-
U�S� conflict� Such PLA strikes are likely to inflict very heavy losses in terms of 
personnel and combat assets and other matériel�108 In such a scenario, the United 
States might inadvertently honor homeland sanctuary as a direct result of suc-
cessful PLA strikes degrading U�S� in-theater capabilities� However, high losses 
also would trigger significant pressure from Congress, cabinet secretaries, senior 
officials, and the general public for the president to authorize robust conventional 
strikes against targets across the Chinese mainland�
Second, even if the United States suffered very heavy initial losses in person-
nel and matériel, it eventually would execute high-intensity conventional strikes 
across the Chinese mainland, if U�S� force-projection assets were able to deploy into 
theater� For instance, the JOAC, which contains the ASBC and Gaining and Main-
taining Access Concept (GMAC), aims to execute high-intensity, war-fighting 
operations and strikes against the homelands of A2/AD adversaries�109 Notice 
also that the GMAC explicitly states that U�S� Army and Marine Corps special 
forces might be inserted covertly into an adversary’s homeland to “provide hu-
man contact to complement other intelligence�”110
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Third, the U�S� Department of Defense openly acknowledges that the military 
must be ready to execute joint military operations against A2/AD adversaries 
“at the outset of a contingency to avoid delays for buildups�”111 The JOAC states 
that “joint forces will attempt to penetrate into the depth of an enemy’s anti-
access/area-denial defenses � � � to disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive 
system�”112 The ASBC states that deep strikes against A2/AD adversaries have the 
objective of “disrupting, destroying or defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabili-
ties�” The ASBC also states that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a 
sanctuary�”113 The deep-strike objectives of Pentagon operating concepts and the 
notion of covert special forces teams operating across the Chinese mainland, 
combined with the stated need to be ready at the outset of a conflict and open 
acknowledgment that the U�S� homeland could be targeted, strongly suggest that 
the U�S� military does not plan on granting the PLA homeland sanctuary during 
a China-U�S� conflict�
Fourth, the United States, owing to its geographic distance from the western 
Pacific, could be seen by global public opinion as a largely unnecessary target� 
This is in stark contrast to the Chinese homeland, which out of necessity would 
be seen as a valid target for conventional U�S� strikes, since the vast majority of 
PLA conventional-strike capabilities are land-based ballistic missiles and long-
range bombers� Consequently, if the PLA executed conventional strikes against 
the U�S� mainland, particularly in a conflict in which China was viewed globally 
as the aggressor, then global public opinion could strengthen the scale of coali-
tion forces levied against the PLA� This would be true particularly in the case of 
U�S� allies and security partners that otherwise might opt out of direct participa-
tion in a China-U�S� conflict� As the RAND Corporation has noted, in a short 
conflict third parties would make little difference, but in a more protracted con-
flict between China and the United States the implications could be significant�114 
Despite these counterarguments, the Chinese government still might believe 
that the PLA could strike at U�S� forces in the western Pacific with minimal risk 
of conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland, given an asymmetry in 
homeland sanctuary� 
Treaty Limitations on Aircraft
The second limitation is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) severely handicaps the acquisition of B-21 Raider long-range strike 
bombers, since the aircraft will be capable of delivering both conventional and 
nuclear ordnance�115 New START requires U�S� and Russian nuclear arsenals not 
to exceed 1,500 nuclear warheads and eight hundred nuclear delivery vehicles, 
with seven hundred deployed and one hundred not deployed�116 Under New 
START, nuclear delivery vehicles are defined as ICBMs, submarine-launched 
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ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers�117 A nuclear bomber is defined by New 
START as an aircraft that has a maximum one-way range exceeding eight thou-
sand kilometers and that could carry nuclear weapons�118 The problem is that a 
B-21 Raider with an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 km, as needed to strike 
deep into the Chinese mainland from Guam, would give the aircraft a total range 
of around eleven thousand kilometers� Given that the B-21 will be capable of 
delivering both nuclear and conventional ordnance, it will be counted under 
New START� Consequently, the challenge for the USAF will be finding a way to 
increase the size of its combat-coded conventional long-range stealth bomber 
force without violating New START�
One solution would be to produce a nonnuclear-capable variant of the B-21, 
since nonnuclear variants would not count� According to the treaty, a nuclear 
bomber is no longer counted once it has been permanently modified to be inca-
pable of delivering nuclear ordnance and is visibly distinguishable from nuclear-
capable variants�119 Modifications include ensuring that all mechanisms of the 
internal weapon bays are “incapable of employing nuclear armaments�”120 Other 
modifications would need to be made to the external design of a conventional 
B-21 variant to render it visibly different from the nuclear variant�121 With a 
conventional-only B-21 variant, the United States theoretically could produce as 
many conventional B-21s as it requires without breaching New START� Another 
solution might be to reduce modestly the USAF’s inventory of nuclear-armed 
ICBMs, from four hundred under New START to three hundred�122 This would 
allow the USAF to order a total of two hundred B-21 Raiders and still comply 
with New START� Ultimately, either solution would increase significantly the 
number of combat-coded B-21s, greatly enhancing the capacity of the USAF to 
execute long-range strikes across the Chinese mainland from Guam� Moreover, 
increasing the B-21 Raider production order to two hundred or more units would 
drive down acquisition costs by distributing fixed research, development, and 
other costs over a larger production run�
Treaty Limitations on Weapons
The third limitation is that the acquisition of conventional theater-strike HBG 
weapons could breach New START, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, or both� Under New START, an ICBM is defined as a nuclear-
capable system that travels for most of its flight path in a ballistic trajectory, with 
a range exceeding 5,500 km�123 The INF Treaty requires that U�S� and Russian 
militaries dismantle all ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km� 
The INF Treaty defines a ballistic missile as a weapon that follows a ballistic tra-
jectory for the majority of its flight path�124
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However, HBG weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory for the majority of 
their flight path and thus would not be subject to limitations under New START 
or the INF Treaty�125 Consequently, the U�S� military could develop an HBG 
weapon with a range of 5,500 km or greater, yet avoid breaching either treaty�
First-Strike Risk
The fourth limitation is that launching one or more HBG weapons could be mis-
construed by the PLA, Russia, or both as a U�S� nuclear first strike� This risk has 
been discussed since the conceptualization of hypersonic boost-glide systems, 
because they depend on long-range rocket boosters similar to those that nuclear-
armed ballistic missiles use�
However, the nonballistic flight path of hypersonic boost-glide weapons, plus 
a brand-new rocket booster design, would make a U�S� hypersonic boost-glide 
system appear distinct on Chinese and Russian nuclear early-warning systems�126 
If the United States were able to assure China and Russia that its hypersonic 
boost-glide systems were used exclusively for conventional payloads, this would 
further reduce the likelihood of HBG-weapon use being misinterpreted as a 
nuclear first strike�
Potential Nuclear Aggression
The fifth limitation is that striking at the PLA’s conventional ballistic-missile 
manufacturing and maintenance facilities, storage facilities, and launchers could 
be misconstrued as an attempt by the United States to degrade the PLA’s nuclear 
deterrent�127 This risk would arise because U�S� theater commanders would be 
unable to distinguish readily between nuclear and conventional versions of the 
PLA’s ballistic-missile arsenal, particularly if U�S� C4ISR systems were degraded 
by PLA ASAT and cyber strikes�
This problem could be solved through a U�S�-China bilateral agreement for the 
PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles from its conventional arsenal 
and a mutual commitment to exclude all nuclear deterrents from targeting� The 
net result would be a reduced risk of U�S� conventional strikes inadvertently tar-
geting PLA nuclear capabilities�
Hardened Structures
The sixth limitation is that a U�S� conventional access strategy might not over-
come the PLA’s extensive investments in hardened structures� This is a very 
real possibility� To paraphrase Moltke, no plan, however good, survives contact 
with the enemy�128 However, the measures proposed under a U�S� conventional 
access strategy would provide a reasonable ability to neutralize PLA hardened 
facilities, such as underground tunnels and sea-level submarine pens� This con-
ventional access strategy prioritizes advanced penetrator ordnance delivered by 
HBG theater-strike missiles and B-2s and B-21s, as well as AUVs armed with 
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large conventional warheads for sea-level tunnels and submarine pens� While 
the penetration capabilities of all ordnance might not be able to overcome PLA 
HDBTs, such as tunnels buried deep within mountains, what this ordnance could 
do is target the most vulnerable points of these structures� For instance, these 
weapons could target external communications links and surface-level entrances� 
By targeting surface-level entrances of PLA hardened facilities, U�S� penetrator 
ordnance could be sufficient to seal the structures from the outside world, or at 
the very least impede the movement of traffic in and out of the facilities� The ad-
vantage of targeting surface-level entrances is that every underground hardened 
structure must be accessible from the surface, making them a vulnerability of all 
PLA HSs and HDBTs that can be exploited�
Survivable and Capable Force-Projection Capability
A seventh limitation is that the United States might consider fielding a highly 
survivable and capable force-projection capability designed to achieve the same 
objective as the proposed conventional access strategy, just with less risk of es-
calation� While it is true that the United States could field a highly capable and 
survivable force-projection capability, funding levels will determine whether it 
will do so�
To field a force structure capable of defeating A2/AD adversaries, the U�S� 
military would need to invest in many of the nine following critical capabilities: 
arsenal ships; additional future guided-missile frigates (FFG-Xs); additional 
Virginia-class SSNs; a large number of AUVs; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, 
carrier-based strike aircraft; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, land-based 
air-superiority fighter; additional B-21 Raiders; a new, stealthy C3 intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) aircraft; and a new, stealthy, in-flight 
refueling tanker (see table 2)� The numerous new research, development, and 
acquisition programs needed would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, even 
without accounting for significant additional orders of DDGs, FFG-Xs, SSNs, 
and B-21s�
In short, the United States can field a highly survivable and capable counter-
A2/AD force—it is just a question of the funding and political willingness to do 
so� Conversely, a U�S� conventional access strategy aims to achieve similar power-
projection objectives with less of a burden to the U�S� taxpayer, or fewer seismic 
departures from the planned military force structure, or both�
The PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to execute a conven-
tional first strike against U�S� bases and forward-deployed forces west of Hawaii� 
The Chinese leadership could be convinced that a decisive conventional first 
strike, in conjunction with other PLA capabilities, would provide the PLA with 
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temporary regional superiority, giving China a rare window of opportunity to 
settle regional disputes through coercion and on terms favorable to China� Any 
such perception would undermine seriously the U�S� military’s ability to deter 
Chinese aggression in the western Pacific� 
The solution is not for the U�S� military to build a larger force structure but 
rather for it to rearrange its thinking around a conventional access strategy� This 
would require the U�S� military to acquire four critical capabilities: a theater-
wide passive-defense capability, a conventional theater-strike capability, a 
Capability Description
Arsenal ships The U�S� Navy could consider a new class of large-displacement surface 
ship, armed with 288–512 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system 
cells and a larger, more capable ballistic missile–defense radar than the 
AN/SPY-6� 
Additional FFG-Xs The U�S� Navy could consider expanding its order of FFG-Xs to serve 
as capable surface combatant escorts for convoys of fleet oilers and dry-
cargo and resupply ships, as would be needed to sustain high-intensity 
combat operations in the western Pacific�
Additional nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines (SSNs)
The U�S� Navy could consider accelerating the acquisition of Virginia 
Payload Module–equipped SSNs, particularly given the projected 
undersea strike shortfall when the fourth Ohio-class nuclear-powered 
guided-missile submarine is retired in 2028�a
Autonomous underwater vehicles 
(AUVs)
The U�S� Navy could consider acquiring AUVs armed with lightweight 
torpedoes designed to deny maritime zones to PLA surface and subsur-
face forces�
Sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft The U�S� Navy could consider truncating its order of F-35Cs in favor of 
developing a sixth-generation carrier-based, long-range strike and air-
superiority aircraft�
Sixth-generation land-based aircraft The U�S� Air Force could consider truncating its order of F-35As in favor 
of developing a sixth-generation land-based, long-range air-superiority 
aircraft with sufficient unrefueled range to escort B-21s during deep-
penetration strikes�
Additional B-21s The U�S� Air Force could consider retaining its planned fleet of one hun-
dred nuclear-capable B-21s, plus a significant order of conventional-only 
B-21s, perhaps on the order of three to four hundred aircraft�
Stealthy C3ISR aircraft The U�S� Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, very high- 
altitude, long-range C3ISR aircraft, capable of replacing satellite com-
munications networks during a conflict�
Stealthy in-flight refueling tanker The U�S� Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, long-range 
in-flight refueling tanker� This aircraft should be fitted with a tail ramp 
to enable variants to support the covert insertion and sustainment of 
special operations forces deep inside hostile territory�
TABLE 2
U.S. COUNTER-A2/AD FORCE-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Note:
 a. Gunzinger and Dougherty, Outside-In, p. 85.
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theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability� Strategically, a con-
ventional access strategy would accomplish several things: it would deny the PLA 
a conventional first-strike capability, increase the permissiveness of the western 
Pacific for follow-on U�S� forces, buy valuable time needed to mobilize and deploy 
U�S� power-projection assets, focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities, 
and impose resource constraints on the PLA� However, a conventional access 
strategy would require the United States to think seriously about developing 
and assigning a new rocket booster exclusively for use by hypersonic boost-glide 
systems, as well as to assure Russia and China that U�S� HBG weapons would 
carry only conventional payloads� Furthermore, the United States and China 
would have to give serious consideration to entering into a bilateral agreement 
for the PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles and for both parties to 
exclude nuclear deterrents from targeting�
Even with its limitations, a U�S� conventional access strategy would return the 
China-U�S� strategic deterrence calculus to a more stable equilibrium� One hopes 
that this would deter Chinese leaders from seeing a conventional first strike as a 
credible option� Pursuing a U�S� conventional access strategy would be a political 
decision for the president and Congress� Such a decision would have to take into 
account numerous dimensions, including military, political, fiscal, diplomatic, 
and technological maturity considerations� Such discussions fall beyond the 
scope of this article but provide ideal areas for future research�
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